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ABSTRACT 
The present study assesses the market integration of chickpea in 
India from 2003 to 2010. The month end prices of chickpea for 
twelve markets in north India were used for the study. Out of twelve 
markets, only three markets are cointegrated, indicating weak 
integration of chickpea markets in India. However, the terminal 
markets located in major consuming (Delhi) and export/import 
locations (Dohad/Gujarat) clearly play an important role in price 
discovery and influences other domestic markets indicating the 
relevance of the import prices and large consuming centres on local 
market prices. Error correction terms indicate that the adjustment 
process from short-term disequilibrium in prices to long run price 
equilibrium is very slow. Overall, there is evidence of weak 
cointegration in the chickpea markets in North India and imports and 
major consuming centres are playing an important role in price 
discovery in domestic chickpea markets. 
INTRODUCTION
Spatial and temporal market integration is an indicator of the efficient 
functioning of agricultural markets. India has been implementing agricultural 
liberalization policies since the early 1990s. It has been argued that such market 
reforms are required for achieving efficient agricultural markets and hence an 
efficient agricultural production system. Until agricultural markets are integrated, 
producers and consumers will not realize the potential gains from liberalization. The 
term ‘spatial market integration’ refers to a situation in which the prices of a 
commodity in spatially separated markets move together and the price signals and 
information are transmitted smoothly across the markets. Hence, spatial market 
performance may be evaluated in terms of the relationship between the prices of 
spatially separated markets, and spatial price behaviour in regional markets may be 
used as a measure of overall market performance.  
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There are several studies that have dealt with the measurement of market 
cointegration, especially in food markets in many countries (Baulch, 1997; Engle and 
Granger 1987; Johansen,1988; Johansen and Juselius,1990). However, work in this 
field in India has been very limited (Jha et al., 1997; Blyn, 1973; Ghosh, 2000; Deb, 
2004; Reddy and Reddy, 2011). Most of the studies pertaining to major food grains 
like rice and wheat and no study has yet been focused particularly on widely spread 
and thinly traded food grains such as pulses in India. Jha et al., (1997) investigated 
rice and wheat market integration in India, carrying out binary and multivariate 
cointegration tests. Applying these methods to the monthly wholesale prices of rice 
and wheat for the period from 1980 to 1990, they observed that all pairs of prices of 
rice as well as of wheat are cointegrated. Moreover, for both the crops, all the prices 
taken together are linked in a cointegrating relationship. Based on these results, they 
concluded that food markets all over India are highly integrated. Reddy and Reddy 
(2011) analysed groundnut pod, oil and cake markets in India in the post-
liberalisation period, they concluded that out of eleven groundnut pod and ten oil 
wholesale markets, only four markets are co-integrated, while in case of groundnut 
cake only two markets are co-integrated out of five major markets. In case of 
groundnut oil and cake, price information flows from major import/export markets 
like Mumbai and Chennai to major producing centres, as price of groundnut oil and 
other edible oils (like palm oil, soyaoil) are interrelated and being freely traded 
internationally, edible oil price discovery takes place in these centres and are linked 
to border prices. 
A study by Ghosh (2000) using the Johansen method of cointegration, evaluated 
the inter-state and intra-state regional integration of rice markets by testing the long-
run linear relationship between the prices. One price was set by law in the regional 
markets within the state of Uttar Pradesh, whereas in Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal 
a single price was not maintained by law, even though the rice markets were 
integrated. At an inter-state level, prices are integrated, but a law stipulating one price 
has not been implemented. On the whole, the regional rice markets within and across 
the states are spatially linked in the long run, suggesting that prices provided relevant 
signals to the regional markets within and across the states. In line with Ghosh 
(2000), the present study evaluates the spatial integration of chickpea markets in 
India by using the methods of Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen and Juselius 
(1990).  
Present study also examines the long-term causality effect by applying granger 
causality tests and short-term price adjustment to the long-run equilibrium price by 
using the error correction model. The methodology adopted here allows  to answer 
the following questions: (a) Whether the chickpea prices in spatially separated 
markets are sufficiently related to each other in the long run? (b) Whether the short-
run price movements in a given market are determined by their own past prices or do 
they need to be seen in the context of integrated prices determined by past prices in 
other chickpea markets? (c) Whether short-run price movements are stabilizing? 
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Prices in the short run can be adjusted in various ways. A stable form of adjustment is 
when the prices are adjusted a long-run relationship between the prices is reached 
quickly. (d) How many markets are exogenous to the process of price formation? In 
these markets the changes in prices in the other markets do not matter. In some ways, 
these markets are prime movers in the overall market.  
General Condition of Chickpea Markets in India 
Chickpea is a major pulse crop grown in India. They account for more than 40 
% of total pulse production in India. Two types of markets exist for chickpeas, 
terminal markets and secondary/primary markets. In the terminal markets (Delhi, 
Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata), the chickpeas traded are mainly from major 
chickpea growing regions as well as imports from other countries (more details about 
Indian pulses markets, especially the chickpea markets are described by  Reddy 
(2004 & 2009); Reddy and Reddy (2010); and Reddy et al., (2007). The 
primary/secondary markets are those where the chickpeas being traded are mainly 
from domestic chickpea producing regions in India. The interstate trade in chickpea 
is growing due to the removal of interstate movement restrictions and due to the 
expansion into south and central India where chickpea consumption is low. 
Chickpeas are sold in primary or secondary wholesale markets directly by the 
producer to a broker, a commission agent, and middlemen. The bulk of the chickpea 
from brokers and commission agents are sold to primary wholesalers who in turn sell 
them to the millers and processors of dal or to secondary wholesalers. A proportion 
of the dal from dal millers and primary wholesalers goes to secondary wholesalers, 
and  then sold to consumers as dal through the retailer. A major portion of chickpea 
production also goes to retailers without any post-harvest process for consumption as 
a whole-grain. Some whole-chickpea from secondary wholesalers are sold to frying 
mills.  Puffed or roasted chickpeas are sold to consumers via retail markets (Agbola 
et al., 2004).  
The chickpea trade in India has been subject to many restrictions during pre-
liberalization up to 1994, such as the regulations of the Essential Commodities Act of 
1955, compulsory levies on millers, stocking limits for private traders, milling 
reserved only for small scale industries, occasional restrictions of interstate 
movements and prohibition of future trading. Most of these restrictions have recently 
been lifted. Now there is no direct government regulation on chickpea marketing in 
India, with a few exceptions like the prohibition of the export of split chickpea in 
anything larger than 5-kilogram packs. This makes export of split chickpea more 
costly, as the additional cost of packaging is estimated to be approximately Rs.315- 
495 ton-1 which is about 3 to 4% of the chickpeas, which makes it non-competitive. 
The Indian government removed the import levy on chickpeas in 1998. Procurement 
of chickpeas at Minimum Support Price (MSP) by the government agencies during 
the harvest period is another major government intervention in the chickpea markets. 
However, over the years, for the pulses including chickpea, the MSP has generally 
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remained below the market price, and therefore has had no noticeable procurement 
by government agencies and have negligible impact on the price of chickpea in India. 
Overall, the chickpea markets in India are functioning under little restrictions from 
the government and the market price is more or less determined by a supply and 
demand situation in a free competitive environment.  
The data used in the cointegration exercise consist of month-end wholesale 
prices of chickpea for the period from May 2003 to January 2010. The data relating 
to chickpea prices quoted in 12 spatially separated markets was compiled from 
various issues of the Agricultural Situation in India, a monthly journal published by 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India. All these markets are major 
chickpea producing and consuming centers, even though the choice of the states and 
the markets from each state has been constrained by the availability of consistent data 
for the period under consideration. On that basis, the following markets were chosen: 
Patna and Matihari from Bihar, Dohad from Gujarat, Rohtak from Haryana, Jaipur 
and Sriganganagar from Rajasthan, Allahabad, Jhansi, Hapur, Kanpur and Kalpi from 
Uttar Pradesh and one market centre from Delhi (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Locations of Selected chickpea markets for the study 
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METHODOLOGY 
Two markets are considered to be spatially integrated if, in the presence of trade 
between them, the price in the importing market (Pit) is equal to the price in the 
exporting market (Pet) plus the transport and other transfer costs involved in moving 
goods between them (Tt
ei). This is because of the spatial arbitrage condition given by 
Pit=P
e
t+Tt
ei. Market integration does not, however, necessarily imply that markets are 
competitive. The condition of spatial arbitrage and market integration are fully 
consistent with competitive pricing as well as oligopolistic pricing practices. 
The approaches that are generally used for testing market integration may be 
classified into two broad categories. The first, the ‘Law of One Price’ (LOP), tests for 
the perfect co-movement of prices and assumes that if markets are integrated, price 
changes in the export market will be transmitted to the import markets on a one-for-
one basis. The LOP requires that trade flows between two markets must occur in 
every period and that prices in one market are determined exogenously. These are, 
however, highly restrictive assumptions that are rarely satisfied in the real world. To 
avoid some of these problems, a second approach, cointegration, is used to test for 
spatial market integration. A cointegration test can be used even in a situation when 
the co-movement of prices is less than perfect, prices are simultaneously determined 
and there are seasonal variations in transfer costs. Moreover, under certain 
conditions, the multivariate maximum likelihood cointegration method allows a test 
for LOP. The LOP holds if there are n-1 cointegrating vectors, among ‘n’ price series 
and all contains a common stochastic trend. It is for these reasons, and because most 
prices tend to be non-stationary, that the cointegration method has recently become 
the primary tool for investigating market integration in terms of a long-run linear 
relationship between prices. The most frequently used cointegration test is the Engle-
Granger test. This study use both Engle and Granger test and ML method of 
cointegration, otherwise known as the Johansen and Juselius (1990) test. The 
Johansen and Juselius (1990) method allows for testing multiple cointegrating 
vectors within a multivariate framework. Since this test is carried out in a reduced 
form vector autoregressive (VAR) model, it does not involve the endogeneity 
problem, and because of that, the test results remain invariant to the choice of the 
variable selected for normalization in the regression. A mathematical illustration of 
above methods is given below. 
Engle Granger Cointegration Tests 
Engle and Granger (1987) formulation tests on residuals from the cointegration 
regression are as follows:  
t?P?P t2t1 ???  ----------------(1) 
Where, P1 and P2 are two price series from different regions. The residuals from 
the above equation are considered to be temporary deviations from the long-run 
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equilibrium. ADF unit root tests are then conducted on the residual t? obtained from 
equation (1) based on the following linear equation:  
tit
m
i
itt ?????? ????? ?
?
? ?
1
1  ---------(2) 
Where ?  and ?  are the estimated parameters and ?  is the error term. A 
cointegration test will be carried out on the estimated coefficient,? . If the t-statistic 
of the coefficient exceeds the critical value reported in Engle and Yoo (1987), the 
residuals, t?  from the cointegration equation (1) will be stationary, and thus the price 
series P1 and P2 will be cointegrated.  
A hypothesis of no integration is rejected if the t-statistics are greater than the 
critical value in absolute terms. Otherwise, it can be concluded that the two price 
series are cointegrated. A number of lags (m) in equation 2 have been chosen to 
ensure that the error term? , is uncorrelated. The present study tries to use a variety 
of lags and the optimal results are reported using Akaic information criteria. 
Johansen test 
Following Johansen and Juselius (1990), the ML method of cointegration will 
be briefly outlined here. If Pt denotes an (n*1) vector of I (1) prices, then the k
th order 
vector autoregressive (VAR) representation of Pt may be written as: 
??tµ?? t
1
t
k
i
i it
??????
?
? ; (t=1,2,…..,T)      -------(3) 
The procedure for testing cointegration is based on the error correction model 
(ECM) representation of Pt given by: 
??tµ??????
1
1
tktit
k
i
it
??????? ??
?
?
      --------(4) 
where ? ? 1,...21,i;? t.....?1??i ?????? k ;    
).....(
1 ????????? k ; 
Each of ?i represents n*n matrices of parameters; ?t and is an identically and 
independently distributed n-dimensional vector of residuals with zero mean and 
variance matrix, where ??; µ is a constant term and t is a trend. Since Pt-k is I (1), but 
?Pt and ?Pt-1 variables are I (0), equation (4) will be balanced if ?Pt-k is I (0). Thus, it 
is the ? matrix which conveys information about the long-running relationship 
between the variables in Pt. The rank of ?, r, determines the number of cointegrating 
vectors, as it determines how many linear combinations of Pt are stationary. If the 
prices are stationary in levels, and if r=0, no linear combinations of Pt are stationary. 
MARKET INTEGRATION OF GRAIN LEGUMES IN INDIA 17 
If 0<rank (?)=r<n, and there are n*r matrices such as that ? =??’, then it can be said 
that there are r cointegrating relations among the elements of Pt. The cointegrating 
vector ? has the property that ?’Pt is stationary even though Pt itself is non-stationary. 
The matrix ? measures the strength of the cointegrating vector in the ECM, as it 
represents the speed of adjustment parameters. Two likelihood ratio test statistics are 
proposed to test number of cointegrating vectors. The null hypothesis of at most r 
cointegrating vectors against a general alternative hypothesis of more than r 
cointegrating vectors can be tested by the trace statistics: 
)
i
ln(1?)( ?n
1ri
?
??
? ???? trace  
The null of r cointegrating vector against the alternative of r+1 can be tested by 
the maximum Eigen value statistic: 
?ˆ 1rmax ?ln(1)( ????? ) 
Given that ?is represents the estimated Eigen values (characteristic roots) 
obtained from the ? matrix and T stands for the number of usable observations (for 
details, see Johansen and Juselius, 1990). The number of cointegrating vectors 
indicated by the tests is an important indicator of the extent of co-movement of 
prices. An increase in the number of cointegrating vectors implies an increase in the 
strength and stability of price linkages. 
Error Correction Model and Causality Tests  
After confirming that a long-run relationship exists among the price series, the 
ECM was applied to investigate the short-run causality between variables further and 
to establish the speed of adjustment of the short-run disequilibrium to the long-run 
equilibrium. The error correction model for a three variable case can be expressed as 
follows: 
? t1
m
1k
? kt3?Ck?P jt2
m
1j
Bj?P it1
m
1i
Aiµ 1t1??0 0?P t1 ??? ?
????
????
???? -----(5) 
? t2
m
1k
? kt3?Fk?P jt2
n
1j
E j?P it1
m
1i
Diµ 1t2??0 1?P t2 ??
??????
????
???? -----(6) 
 
----(7) 
 
Where P1, P2  and P3 denote the price series in different markets. The error 
correction terms are  
?
1?t ,  
? t3
m
1k
? kt3?Lk?P jt2
n
1j
H j?P it1
m
1i
G iµ 1t3
??0 2?P t3 ??
?????
?
???
?
????
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For the residuals are obtained from the cointegrating equation (1) of a 
cointegrating price series. The number of error correction terms in each equation 
depends on the number of cointegrated vectors in the price series. The past values of 
error terms in the equation have an impact on the changes of variables P1t , P2t and P3t 
. The ?1t,, ?2t and ?3t are stationary random processes capturing other information not 
contained in either lagged value of P1t , P2t and P3t. Finally, the m is the optimal lag 
order to be determined by using the final prediction error procedures using Akaike 
information criteria. 
There is a strong connection between cointegration and causality in that at least 
one granger causal relationship must exist in a cointegrated system. Causality from P2 
to P1 and from P1 to P2 (there may be bi-directional causality) may be tested using the
equation 5 to 7 of the error correction mode. Rejection of the joint hypothesis:  
B1=….. Bm  =0 
(by standard F-tests) implies causality from P2 to P1 because a lagged P2 
provides a better prediction of current changes in P1 once lagged P1 has already been 
accounted for by the error correction term 
( ?
1?t ) . Similarly rejecting D1=… Dm  =0 (through an F test) indicates granger 
causality from P1 to P2. 
RESULTS
Test for unit roots 
Before conducting cointegrating tests, there is a need to examine the univariate 
time-series properties of the data and confirm that all the price series are non-
stationary and integrated in the same order. This can be established by a visual 
examination of the price series and by using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 
Test developed by Dickey and Fuller (1981) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test 
(Phillips and Perron, 1988). Through a visual examination of figure 2 one can infer 
that the price of chickpeas in different locations ranged between Rs.1000 and 
Rs.2500 during the study period and that there was an upward movement of prices 
during the period. The first difference in the price series is shown in figure 3 and it 
seems that the series is stationary at this point. To make an objective judgment about 
unit roots, ADF and PP tests have been conducted. 
A Dickey-Fuller test can be applied to the first-order auto-regressive model that 
includes the drift and linear time trend (t): 
? tt?2x 1t?1?0x t? ????? ----------(8) 
To test for the presence of a unit root in equation 8, it is necessary to test the 
null hypothesis H0:B1=0, against H0:B1<0, with the left-sided critical region referring 
to the critical values provided in the DF tables.  
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An Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) test controls for serial correlation by 
adding lagged first-differences to a DF equation. The application of ADF tests has 
been discussed for problems arising due to the deterministic part of regression and 
selection of appropriate lag lengths. As a result, the application of a sequential 
procedure has often been suggested while implementing an ADF test. In this study, a 
sequential testing has been used, which involves a step-by-step testing procedure, by 
considering three different equations: 
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? t?x iti ?it?2x 1t?1?0?x t ???????? --------(9) 
??x?x???x titi i1t10t ???? ?? ? -------------(10) 
??x?x??x titi i1t1t ??? ?? ? -------------------(11) 
To examine the presence of the unit root, there is a need to test the null 
hypothesis H0:B1=0, in all three equations by using ADF test statistics.  
Phillips-Perron Test: One possible weakness in the ADF tests has been that their 
underlying distribution theories assume that residual errors are statistically 
independent and have a constant variance, which may not be true for many time 
series data. Phillips and Perron (1988) developed non-parametric test statistics, which 
involve less-restrictive assumptions about the error process. In this case, the 
hypothesis: H0:B1=0, is tested by using ??-statistics and referring to the critical values 
of DF tables. The 2 lag lengths have been selected on the basis of maximum Akaike 
information criteria. 
Table 1. Results of the Augmented Dickey-fuller tests for the order of 
Integration
ADF test with 2 lags 
Market centres 
In level In First difference 
  I(1) vs. I(0) I(2) vs. I(1) 
Patna -2.095 -5.154* 
Matihari -2.791 -4.797* 
Dohad -2.349 -4.960* 
Rohtak 2.269 -4.436* 
Jaipur -2.305 -4.757* 
Sriganganagar -1.891 -4.687* 
Allahabad -2.117 -4.484* 
Hapur -1.882 -4.535* 
Jhansi -2.023 -4.409* 
Kanpur -2.301 -4.707* 
Kalpi -1.955 -4.599* 
Delhi -2.266 -4.454* 
Notes: * indicates significant at 1 percent level. For n=82, 1 per cent and 5 per cent critical values for 
ADF statistics are –4.0052 and –3.4611 respectively. ADF is calculated with the assumption of constant 
and time trend. 
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Given that all the prices are now integrated in the same order (order one) by 
measuring ADF and PP tests, we may now proceed to conduct the cointegration tests. 
As we have chosen comparable varieties/grades of chickpeas across the markets, we 
can assume that price variability is caused by spatial effects and not by differences in 
grades/variety. 
Table 2: Philips and Perron test for unit roots for first difference of price series. 
Market centres Test with 2 lags 
  p-stat Alpha 
Patna -6.2993* -0.6359 
Matihari -5.3138* -0.5262 
Dohad 8.2616* -0.9323 
Rohtak -4.9279* -0.451 
Jaipur -9.4093* -1.112 
Sriganganagar -9.0506* -0.9408 
Allahabad -8.3489* -0.9169 
Hapur -11.2554* -1.0572 
Jhansi -7.3119* -0.7299 
Kanpur -6.7018* -0.7333 
Kalpi -6.4575* -0.7252 
Delhi -4.151* -0.3612 
Note: critical value are –3.4391,-2.9152 and –2.5841 at 1,5% and 10% level of significance. * indicates 
significant at 1% level of significance. 
Test for long run cointegration 
Engle Granger Bivariate Cointegration Tests 
The Engle and Granger test for cointegration results is presented in appendix 1. 
The results show that the Patna market is cointegrated with three other chickpea 
markets, namely Jaipur, Sriganaganagar and Hapur at  1% level of significance and 
with three other markets - Dohad, Jhansi and Kalpi - at  5% level of significance, 
while Jaipur market is cointegrated with Hapur, Jhansi and Patna markets. The 
Rohtak, Allahabad and Delhi markets are not influenced by any other chickpea 
markets, and so are exogenous to the system. There is a two-way causation between 
the Jaipur (Rajastan)-Hapur (Uttar Pradesh) and the Jaipur (Rajastan)-Jhansi (Uttar 
Pradesh) markets. This indicates that chickpea markets are integrated across the 
states. Overall, only eleven out of sixty-six relationships are cointegrated, which 
indicates a very low level of integration in the chickpea markets in India. However, 
due to the inability of the Engle and Granger test to test multiple cointegration 
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(testing of cointegration among three or more price series at a time) Johanson method 
was used for testing the number of cointegrating price series from a range of twelve 
price series and the results are presented in following section.  
Johansen Multivariate cointegration test 
The results of the multivariate cointegration tests are reported in table 3. The ?-
trace statistics show that five markets are cointegrated, while the ?-max test indicates 
that three markets are cointegrated out of twelve markets at  5 % level of 
significance. However, given the fact that the ?-max test is more powerful than the 
trace test, it may be argued that at least three cointegrating vectors exist, along with, 
at best, nine common stochastic trends among the twelve selected chickpea markets 
in North India. The presence of nine common stochastic trends implies the absence of 
pair-wise cointegration of prices, suggesting that the LOP does not hold, even though 
the markets are integrated.  
On the whole, the results of cointegration tests (from both the Engle and 
Granger and Johansen methods) indicate that the regional chickpea markets are 
weakly integrated in the long run, as only three out of twelve markets are 
cointegrated. This also indicates that nine common stochastic trends, and hence nine 
independent markets, exist among the twelve markets. 
Table 3: Johansen cointegration results for spatial integration of chickpea 
markets in India 
Critical 
values 
 Critical values 
Eigen 
Value
null
Trace
statistics
1% 5% Null 
Maximum
Eigen Value 
1% 5% 
0.72 r=0 518.1** 375.3 358.7 r=0 101.6** 87.2 80.0 
0.63 r?1 416.5** 322.4 306.9 r=1 80.5** 81.1 73.9 
0.58 r?2 335.9** 273.4 259.0 r=2 69.2* 74.7 67.9 
0.52 r?3 266.7** 228.2 215.1 r=3 62.3* 68.5 61.8 
0.50 r?4 207.4** 187.2 175.2 r=4 55.0 62.2 55.7 
0.45 r?5 151.3** 150.1 139.3 r=5 47.9 55.8 49.6 
0.35 r?6 103.5 117.0 107.3 r=6 34.1 49.4 43.4 
0.26 r?7 69.3 87.8 79.3 r=7 24.1 42.9 37.2 
0.18 r?8 45.3 62.5 55.2 r=8 15.6 36.2 30.8 
0.15 r?9 29.7 41.1 35.0 r=9 12.6 29.3 24.3 
0.13 r?10 17.1 23.1 18.4 r10 10.8 21.7 17.1 
0.08 r?11 6.3 6.6 3.8 r=11 6.4 6.6 3.8 
** and * indicates significance at 1 and 5% level respectively. 
MARKET INTEGRATION OF GRAIN LEGUMES IN INDIA 23 
Granger causality test
Evidence of causality can be inferred from the F (causality) statistics from the 
Granger causality tests presented in appendix 2 and summarized in table 4, which 
indicate the strength of causality in each market with reference to every other market, 
based on the significance level of F (causality) statistics. Events at the Patna market 
brought about price changes in Kanpur and Kalpi at 10% and 5% significance levels 
respectively. The price changes at Patna were influenced by the markets at Dohad 
and Sriganganagar at  10% significance level. The Delhi, Dohad and Rohtak markets 
are independent markets (exogenous to all markets), and are thus not influenced by 
any other markets, while the Jaipur and Sriganaganagar markets are exogenous to all 
markets except Dohad, at  10% level of significance.  
The results show that the chickpea markets of the adjoining states of Gujarat 
and Rajasthan markets are cointegrated. According to the Granger tests, prices 
movements in the Dohad market cause prices in many markets in Uttar Pradesh (such 
as Jhansi, Allahabad and Kanpur) at 1% level of significance and those in Hapur and 
Kalpi at 5% level of significance), those in Rajastan (Jaipur and Sriganaganagar) at 
10% level and in Bihar (Patna) at 10% level of significance. This indicates that 
cointegration exists among interstate chickpea markets. Matihari prices influence 
price changes in Allahabad, Hapur and Kanpur at 10% level of significance and 
Kalpi at 5% level of significance. On the other hand, the Delhi prices do not 
influence price changes in any market, while Kalpi and Jhansi price movements 
cause price changes only in Matihari. Two-way relationships exist between Matihari-
Kalpi, Matihari-Kanpur, and Matihari-Hapur, as no large markets exist between them 
and they belong to adjoining states. This indicates that state boundaries have little 
influence in segmenting markets. It is noticeable that the exogeneity is concentrated 
in the large consumer markets like Delhi. Furthermore Dohad market prices are 
exogenous to most of the other markets as it is major import/export hub of chickpeas 
to India. On the whole, the Delhi, Rohtak and Dohad markets are exogenous to the 
system, and in some sense they are an important source of price formation according 
to the Granger causality approach, whereas, according to Engle and the Granger 
approaches, the Rohtak, Delhi and Allahabad markets are exogenous to the system. 
Out of 132 price relationships, as many as 118 relationships are strongly exogenous 
to the system in terms of Granger causality (They are marked by an ‘E’ in Table 4). 
This indicates that, in line with the Engle and Granger causality tests, Granger 
causality tests also reveal that most of the markets are not integrated and are 
independent of each other in the long run. 
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Table 4: Causality and Exogeneity among price series 
Dependent 
Independent 
Patna Matihari Dohad Rohtak Jaipur Sriganga Allahabad Hapur Jhansi Kanpur Kalpi Delhi 
Patna  ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) 10% 5% ---(E) 
Matihari ---(E)  ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) 10% 10% ---(E) 10% 1% ---(E) 
Dohad 10% ---(E)  ---(E) 10% 10% 1% 5% 1% 1% 5% ---(E) 
Rohtak ---(E) ---(E) ---(E)  ---(E) ---(E) 5% 5% ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) 
Jaipur ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E)  ---(E) 5% ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) 
Sriganga 10% 5% ---(E) ---(E) ---(E)  ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) 
Allahabad ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E)  ---(E) 10% ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) 
Hapur ---(E) 5% ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E)  10% ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) 
Jhansi ---(E) 10% ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E)  ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) 
Kanpur ---(E) 5% ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E)  10% ---(E) 
Kalpi ---(E) 10% ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E)  ---(E) 
Delhi ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E) ---(E)  
Note: Summarised based on Appendix 2 of granger causality tests, 
(E)-denotes exogenous, 1%,5%,10% indicates significance at that level 
Error correction model (short term adjustment) 
In fact in case of ECM estimates, the coefficient of the error correction terms 
(ECTs) turn out to be positive in many cases (Table 5). These coefficients apparently 
reflect the short-run deviations of the system from the long run equilibrium level. The 
coefficients of ECTs indicate the speed of adjustment of any disequilibrium towards 
the long-run growth path. In the present case, the positive ECTs indicate that the 
short-run disequilibrium adjustment process might not lead to stable long-run prices 
in most of the markets (for example in Patna, Matihari, Allahabad, Hapur, Jhansi, 
Kanpur and Kalpi market prices). However, the results convey that the short-run 
influences of many of the ECTs are statistically insignificant in explaining the price 
changes in many of the locations.  
The Jhansi and Kalpi prices are almost instantly transmitted to Matihari market 
in the same direction in the short-run as indicated by the Jhansi price coefficient 
(0.88) and the Kalpi price coefficient (0.37) for the Matihari regression equation. 
Along the same lines, the price changes in Kalpi positively influenced the price 
changes in Allahabad. The Hapur price is transmitted to Delhi market with a lag in 
the short-run. On the other hand, the Allahabad price is instantly negatively 
transmitted to the Patna market, and the Patna price is negatively transmitted to the 
Allahabad market. Likewise, the Patna price was negatively transmitted to the 
Matihari market, the Allahabad price was negatively transmitted to Jhansi and Delhi 
markets and the Dohad price was negatively transmitted to the Kalpi market. These 
negative coefficients indicate that in addition to spatial price differences, some 
unknown factors are playing predominant role in spatial price transmission.  
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26 Amarender Reddy 
Overall, the short term integration of chickpea market in North India is not 
noticeable. In many cases, error correction terms tends to be positive., indicating that 
short term changes in prices in many markets may not lead to long-term equilibrium 
in the system. Here, the levels of interstate causality appeared to exist to certain 
extent in spatially separated chickpea markets, which indicates that the state barriers 
are not restricting inter-state free trade and the price signals passes through interstate 
markets. 
CONCLUSION 
In general, pulses (grain legumes) markets are fragmented, thinly traded and 
most farmers concentrate on producing for their own domestic consumption with 
little marketed surplus. The chickpea is a very important pulse crop in India. The 
study tested, market integration between major chickpea producer and consuming 
centers in North India, including Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Haryana 
and Delhi, in twelve market locations. Among the twelve markets only three markets 
were cointegrated at 5% level of significant as indicated by ?-max statistic and five 
markets were cointegrated as per ?-trace-statistic. Given the reliability of ?-max, the 
conclusion is that only three cointegrated markets were present among twelve 
selected chickpea markets in North India. Based on these results, one can conclude 
that, even though the chickpea markets in North India were  cointegrated i.e., prices 
move together, either in an upward or downward direction, but the law of one price 
does not hold.  
The causality relationship has been studied by Engle and Granger and also 
through Granger causality tests, which show that price changes in Matihari are 
influenced by five other markets, namely Sriganaganagar, Hapur, Jhansi, Kanpur and 
Kalpi, whereas the Dohad, Rohtak and Delhi markets are exogenous and not 
influenced by any other markets and are thus important sources of price formation. 
The Dohad price influences prices in many other markets and acts as a major source 
of price discovery. About 118 price relationships are exogenous among a total of 132 
relationships, which show that the chickpea markets are weakly integrated.  
The error correction model suggests that the adjustment to deviations from 
equilibrium in the local markets does not lead to a long-term equilibrium in most of 
the markets. The findings reveal that the chickpea markets are different from rice and 
wheat markets. For example, many food market studies [e.g. studies of wheat 
markets by Jha et al., (1997), rice markets by  Ghosh (2000) and rice, potato and 
mustard markets by Palaskas and Harris-White (1993)] reported that food markets are 
cointegrated to a large extent, but the present study has revealed that, even though 
chickpea markets are cointegrated, the extent of cointegration is very limited; i.e., 
only three markets out of twelve markets remain cointegrated in the long run and, in 
many cases, the adjustment process in short term deviations from equilibrium may 
not lead to a long term equilibrium of the system. The major terminal markets in 
large consuming and import/export locations (Delhi, Rohtak and Dohad) are 
MARKET INTEGRATION OF GRAIN LEGUMES IN INDIA 27 
exogenous to the system, and are thus important in price formation in Indian 
chickpea markets. 
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